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Antitrust Merger Policy in Colombia
Alfonso Miranda Londofiot
This paper was delivered as a speech at the Cornell International Law Jour-
nal's 2009 Symposium, Comparative Antitrust Policies in Mergers and
Acquisitions.
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Brief Introduction to Colombian Competition Law
Like most countries in Latin America, Colombia issued a first tier of
antitrust legislation at the end of the 1950s, under the political and aca-
demic influence of the United States and the European Union. However,
competition laws were not applied in this first era, mainly due to the eco-
nomic protectionist model, which did not favor a competitive environment.
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The year 2009 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the expedition of the
first competition law in Colombia, Law 155 of 1959.1 This first law, which
is still largely in effect, was modified in 1963, developed by Decree 1302 of
1964, and then suffered a major addition with the issuance of Decree 2153
in 1992.2
Though Colombia has had a competition law since 1959, the preva-
lence of the protectionist economic model in Latin America meant these
laws were not really effective until the nineties, post-Washington Consen-
sus, when Colombia included a principle of free competition in Article 333
of the 1991 Constitution, 3 changed the economic model in order to open
the markets to international trade, and issued Decree 2153 of 1992, which
represents a modern approach to competition law.
I. Evolution and Reforms in the Region
It is clear that competition law in Latin America, specifically in the
Andean Countries, is steadily evolving due to integration treaties. Not only
was the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) approved by the
U.S. Congress, but following Peru, the Andean countries are struggling
through their own negotiation of a free trade agreement (FTA).
In preparation for the implementation of the FTA with the United
States, many Latin American countries have been discussing or passing
new antitrust laws. At a supranational level, the Andean Community of
Nations (CAN) issued Decision 608, which replaced the old antitrust stat-
ute, Decision 285.4 According to the more recent Decision 616, until Ecua-
dor and Bolivia issue their competition laws, Decision 608 will apply
directly within those countries.5
1. Ley 155 de 1959 [Law 155 of 1959], Diario Oficial [D.O.] 30.138, 14 de Diciem-
bre de 1959 (Colom.).
2. See Decreto 1302 de 1964 [Decree No. 1302 of 19641, D.O. No. 31.922, 3 de
Mayo de 1964 (Colom.); Decreto 2153 de 1992 [Decree No. 2153 of 1992], Diario
Oficial [DO.] 40.704, 30 de Diciembre de 1959 (Colom.).
3. CONST. COL. art. 333 ("Economic activity and private initiative must not be
impeded within the limits of the public good. No one may require permits or licenses to
exercise economic activity except when authorized by law. Free economic competition
is a right of every person, which entails responsibilities. The enterprise, as a basis of
development, has a social function that implies obligations. The state will strengthen
cooperative organizations and stimulate business development. The state, by means of
the law, will prevent impediments to or restrictions of economic freedom and will curb
or control any abuses caused by individuals or enterprises due to their dominant posi-
tion in the national marketplace. The law will limit the scope of economic freedom
when the social interest, the environment, and the cultural patrimony of the nation
require it.").
4. Normas para la protecci6n y promoci6n de la libre competencia en la
Comunidad Andina [Rules for the protection and promotion of free competition in the
Andean Community], Decision 608 (2005), available at http://www.comunidadandina.
org/normativa/dec/D608.htm.
5. Entrada en vigencia de la Decisi6n 608 para la Repfblica del Ecuador [Entry into
force of Decision 608 by the Republic of Ecuador], Decision 616 (2005), available at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/D616.htm.
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This decision was implemented by President Correa in Ecuador by
means of Decree No. 1614, issued on March 14, 2009, through which he
ordered the application of Decision 608 from CAN and appointed his First
Subsecretary of Competition within the Ministry of Commerce.
6
A. Evolution and Reforms in Colombia
1. Law 962, 2005
In 2005, Congress issued Law 962, which orders the application of
civil procedure to unfair trade cases tried before the Superintendence of
Industry and Commerce (SIC). 7 This was a long-awaited reform that has
brought stability and clarity to unfair competition cases that had previ-
ously been tried with a mixture of administrative and civil procedure,
which raised a great deal of procedural and constitutional issues, distract-
ing the authority from the main questions that unfair trade cases pose.
2. Law 1340, Issued July 24, 2009
During the past eighteen years, SIC, acting as general and residual
competition authority, has applied Decree 2153 of 1992 in numerous cases
related to anti-competitive agreements, unilateral anti-competitive conduct,
abuse of dominance, and merger control. The experiences gathered by
SIC, both positive and negative, have helped develop the area and served as
input for a reform of the competition laws, which Congress finally
achieved on July 24, 2009 by issuing Law 1340, after more than twenty-
four months of discussions.8
The principal feature of the new law is the appointment of SIC as the
National Competition Authority. The new law grants SIC the sole power to
apply competition laws in all areas, including specialized sectors, such as
public utilities, banking, insurance, transportation, shipping, etc. This
reform gives SIC the antitrust enforcement capacity granted by Colombian
law to the Superintendence of Public Utilities, the Superintendence of
Banks, the Superintendence of Ports and Transportation, the National Tele-
vision Commission, and the Aeronautic Authority.
The law increases the fines that SIC can impose on companies that
breach competition laws. Currently, the fines can go up to $450,000 for
the companies and $60,000 for the administrators. According to the new
law, sanctions for the companies could go up to $20 million and the sanc-
tions for the administrators can reach $450,000. This is undoubtedly an
important change in antitrust enforcement that will draw the attention of
the administrators and companies that could be subject to costly fines.
6. Decree 1614, 14 de Matzo 2009; see also Registro Oficial No. 558, 27 de Marzo
de 2009; Decision 608, supra note 4.
7. Ley 962 de 2005 [Law 962 of 20051, Diario Oficial [D.O.], art. 1, 8 de Julio de
2005 (Colom.), available at http://web.presidencia.gov.co/leyes/2005/julio/ley9620807
05.pdf.
8. See Ley 1340 de 2009 [Law 1340 of 20091, Diario Oficial [D.O.] 47.420, arts. 3,
4, 12, 16, 17, 24 de Julio de 2009 (Colom.).
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The new law expands the statute of limitations for antitrust investiga-
tions from three to five years. This will provide SIC a longer period to
investigate potential antitrust violations.
Under the new law, if the investigated party wants to offer SIC a settle-
ment, it will only have the opportunity to propose it during the first stages
of the procedure, so that SIC does not have to go through the whole investi-
gation only to have to analyze a settlement proposition at the end.
It also includes a leniency program aimed at pressing collaboration
from the companies and the administrators involved in anticompetitive
conduct. Effective and timely cooperation from companies and persons
involved in the investigated conduct can earn them partial or total immu-
nity from the sanctions that SIC can impose.
Finally, the law modifies the merger review procedure in order to give
it more transparency. It also implements a two-tiered review that allows for
a fast-track authorization (thirty days) in less difficult cases and a longer
review period (three months) in more complex cases. If SIC fails to decide
within the review period, the merger is deemed automatically authorized.
Undoubtedly, the described changes will foster the increasingly active
role competition law has nowadays in the Colombian economy.
B. Principal Cases
One must note that SIC is in charge of controlling anti-competitive and
unfair trade practices, applying consumer protection laws and adminis-
trating the registry of trademarks and patents. SIC is an administrative
authority. In 1998 it was also given judicial authority to decide unfair
trade and consumer protection cases.
From 2004 to 2009, SIC has shown intense activity on all fronts. The
most noteworthy cases during the past years have been related to mergers
and anticompetitive practices. Despite the existence of many competition
authorities and regimes before the new 2009 law, one must recognize that
so far it has been SIC who has produced the main developments in Colom-
bian competition law.
Since 1992, when its new structure was laid down, SIC has enjoyed the
benefit of independent superintendents, who have remained in office for
long periods and have been applying the law in crescendo, constructing a
seasoned doctrine that has caught the public eye due to the importance of
the cases and the impact they produce in the economy.
Among many other transactions, SIC cleared some big acquisitions:
the sale of the national telecommunications company Telecom to the Span-
ish operator Telefonica,9 the transaction between Procter & Gamble and
Gillette, 10 the sale of the supermarket chain Carulla to the French con-
trolled chain txito,11 the sale of the main national newspaper El Tiempo to
9. SIC File No. 6025829, approved by official memorandum (Apr. 5, 2006).
10. SIC Resolution No. 28037 (Nov. 12, 2004); SIC Resolution No. 29807 (Nov. 29,
2004).
11. SIC Resolution No. 34904 (Dec. 18, 2006).
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the Spanish Planeta Group, the sale of the national steel producer Acerias
Paz del Rio to the Brazilian conglomerate Grupo Votorantim, 12 the sale of
the only PVC resin producer Petco to the Mexican manufacturer Mex-
ichem, 13 the subsequent sale of the main PVC tube manufacturer Amanco
also to Mexichem, 14 the acquisition of Petro Rubiales by Pacific Stratus
Energy, 15 the sale of Aluminio Reynolds Santodomingo to the Arfel
Group, 16 the sale of the main cigarette manufacturer Coltabaco to Phillip
Morris, 1 7 and the sale of Bavaria to SabMiller. 18
However, SIC did not clear all of the important transactions. SIC
objected to the Procter & Gamble-Colgate transaction, which related
mainly to the Fab brand, 19 and the Postob6n-Quaker transaction, which
related to the Gatorade brand. 20 In both cases, the main debate between
SIC and the petitioners regarded the definition of the relevant market. In
the P&G-Colgate transaction SIC decided, at the last moment, to narrow
the relevant market of powder soap, departing from the market for washing
products (including powder and bar soap) presented by the companies.
In the Postob6n-Quaker transaction, SIC narrowed the relevant market
to include only isotonic beverages. In this case SIC not only forbade the
transaction, but also launched an investigation in order to establish
whether the parties had closed the transaction before SIC approved the
deal. One should note that under Colombian Law, the authority must
clear economic integrations before they produce effects in the market.
2 1
Failure to inform SIC of the transaction is considered a breach of competi-
tion laws that will result in fines on the companies. 22 If, in addition to
that, SIC concludes that it must prohibit the transaction, a judge could
decide that the deal is absolutely void because of an illicit object, which has
important economic consequences under the Colombian Civil Code.
12. SIC Resolution No. 35379 (Dec. 21, 2006); SIC Resolution No. 2489 (Feb. 2,
2007).
13. SIC Resolution No. 21345 (July 16, 2007); SIC Resolution No. 29154 (Sept. 14,
2007).
14. SIC Resolution No. 21345 (July 16, 2007); SIC Resolution No. 29154 (Sept. 14,
2007).
15. SIC File No. 07131359, approved by official memorandum (Mar. 2, 2008).
16. SIC Resolution No. 05886 (Feb 27, 2008); SIC Resolution No. 019729 Uune 17,
2008).
17. SIC File No. 40129635, approved by official memorandum (Mar. 3, 2005).
18. Oficio 5083695, del 23 de Septiembre de 2005 de la SIC (Colum.). The media
recently disclosed that Philip Morris will attempt the acquisition of the only other ciga-
rette manufacturer in Colombia, Protabaco, which would give the U.S. manufacturer
100% of the production capacity in Colombia. British American Tobacco immediately
issued public statements opposing the transaction for antitrust reasons. It promises to
be a very interesting legal battle.
19. SIC Resolution No. 28037 (Nov. 12, 2004).
20. SIC Resolution No. 16453 (July 23, 2004).
21. See SIC Concepto No. 00001365 (Mar. 2, 2000), available at http://www.sic.gov.
co/Conceptos/Conceptos/ConceptoOO001365.php.
22. Ley 1340 de 2009 [Law 1340 of 2009], Diario Oficial [D.O.] 47.420, art. 25,
24 deJuly de 2009 (Colom.); Decree No. 2153, art. 2, no. 2; art. 4, nos. 15-16 (1992).
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There are no statistics regarding foreign-to-foreign transactions. The
general record of SIC for merger review is as follows:
23
Year Notified Authorized Remedies Objected
1998 132 132 0 0
1999 118 118 0 0
2000 126 123 2 0
2001 121 93 3 0
2002 104 70 9 1
2003 62 47 3 0
2004 97 90 2 3
2005 103 98 3 0
2006 112 98 4 3
2007 83 62 3 1
Total 1058 931 29 8
The highlights in the evolution of SIC's merger doctrine during the
past few years are the following:
In August 2006, SIC issued a new merger regulation that raised the
thresholds for notification of mergers.2 4 It is now mandatory to
inform those operations in which the value of the assets or sales of
the merging companies in Colombia (individually or jointly consid-
ered) are equal to or exceed $20 million. The application of these
thresholds has reduced the number of informed transactions by
forty percent.
Since the Pavco-Ralco transaction, SIC started to impose structural,
as well as behavioral, conditions in order to reduce restrictions on
competition and to authorize complex concentration operations. 25
Structural conditions require divestiture of brands, installed capac-
ity, etc. Behavioral conditions, on the other hand, require steps
such as the elimination of exclusivity. Nowadays, SIC applies all
kinds of conditions but prefers the structural ones. This practice
will continue; for, the new 2009 law allows for the application of
conditions.
* SIC authorized the "Cementos Andino"-"Cementos Argos" transac-
tion based on the Failing Industry Doctrine. 26 Even though this
kind of defense had been considered before, it was not until the
cement merger that SIC laid down the characteristics and requisites
for application of the doctrine.
* SIC developed a doctrine for review of vertical concentrations. It
also concluded that operations such as the sale of a brand or the
23. This table was built based on SIC Concept No. 05120167/2005 (Dec. 7, 2005).
The information is available at http://www.sic.gov.co/Servicios__ en Linea/promocion.
php and on the resolutions, press-releases and official memoranda of the SIC website.
24. SIC Resolution No. 22195 (Aug. 25, 2006), available at http://www.sic.gov.co/
Nor matividad/Resoluciones/Lista%20resoluciones.php.
25. See SIC Resolution No. 04861 (Feb. 27, 2004); SIC Resolution No. 05013 (Mar.
10, 2004).
26. SIC Resolution No. 13544 (May 26, 2006).
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creation of a new company by two previous competitors amount to
an economic concentration that needs authorization from SIC. As
mentioned before, under the new 2009 law, it is clear that SIC will
review vertical integrations if they meet the thresholds.
During the past two years, SIC has claimed jurisdiction over merg-
ers between public utilities companies. It has also disputed the
review of mergers between cable TV companies. As previously
mentioned, the new law leaves no doubt in the sense that SIC is the
merger authority in the mentioned sectors of the economy.
SIC has also issued important decisions on the front of anti-competi-
tive practices. The four main supermarkets in Colombia (txito, Carulla,
Olimpica and Carrefour) were charged with abuse of dominant position,
following an accusation by their suppliers. SIC presided over a complex
negotiation that ended with the settlement of the case and the signing of a
"good practices" agreement between the main associations for commerce
and industry.
Something similar happened in the "credit card case," in which the
two companies that own the credit cards networks were charged with the
cartelization of the commissions. 2 7 The case also ended with a settlement
in which not only the investigated companies, but also the banks that own
the credit cards networks, agreed to important disclosure requirements and
other measures in order to guarantee that each network will set the com-
missions independently.
But not all investigations have ended in settlement. SIC imposed the
largest fine in its history (over one million dollars) on rice grinders who
were found guilty of establishing a cartel in order to buy rice at low cost
from the producers. A fine was also imposed on Cadbury Adams for pred-
atory pricing. Recently, SIC has issued sanctions against the cement and
chocolate industries, which are pending on the decision of a reconsidera-
tion plea filed by the companies.
All of these decisions seem to strengthen the position of SIC and its
role in public opinion.
II. Merger Control in Colombia
The merger control legislation in Colombia is set forth mainly in Law
155, 1959; Decree 1302, 1964; Decree 2153, 1992; Law 1340, 2009; and
Circular No. 10 of the SIC. 28 It is expected that SIC will issue a set of
merger guidelines shortly in order to develop and explain the implications
of the new Law 1340, 2009. Merger regulation for specific sectors is con-
tained in other statutes.
Mergers in the financial and insurance sectors are governed by the
27. SIC Resolution No. 06817 (Mar. 31, 2005).
28. Circular Externa No. 10 [External Circular No. 10], Diario Oficial [D.O.] 44.511
(Colum.); Titulo [Title] VII 2.1 (Aug. 6, 2001) (Colom.), available at http://www.sic.gov.
co/pdf/Circular%20unica/Titulo%20VII%20Promocion%20de%201a%20Competencia.
pdf.
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organic statute for the financial system-Decree 663, 1993.29 Legislation
for mergers between airlines is basically contained in article 1866 of the
Commerce Code and article 3.6.3.7.3 of the Colombian Aeronautic Regula-
tion (RAC). 30 Mergers between television operators are governed by Law
182, 1995.31
A. The National Competition Authority - SIC
SIC is the main authority for merger control in Colombia. As men-
tioned before, SIC is an administrative entity controlled by the government.
The president of Colombia is free to appoint and remove the superinten-
dent from office at his discretion.
Pursuant to article 2 of Law 1340, 2009, SIC has the power to review
mergers in all sectors of the economy, with two exceptions: (i) reorganiza-
tion operations in the financial sector are reviewed by the Financial Super-
intendence, which must hear the opinion of SIC and must apply the
conditions that SIC recommends, if any; and (ii) operational agreements
between airlines, which are reviewed by the Aeronautic Authority.
It is important to point out that the law; especially Law 1340, 2009,
has also given SIC other powers and responsibilities:
* SIC has the power to investigate and sanction anticompetitive prac-
tices in all sectors of the economy.
* SIC applies consumer protection law, an area in which it exercises
administrative and judicial powers, which allow it to impose sanc-
tions for violation of the law and provide for compensation of dam-
ages to consumers.
* SIC is the trademark and patent authority. It also maintains the
industrial property registry.
* In 1998, SIC was given administrative and judicial functions to
decide unfair trade cases. Pursuant to Law 1340, 2009, SIC also
decides administrative unfair trade cases in special sectors like tele-
vision and public utilities.
According to article 9 of Law 1340, 2009, all transactions that consist
of acquisitions, mergers, consolidations, or integrations (whatever the legal
form of the transaction) between companies dedicated to the same activi-
ties or participating in the same vertical value chain, whose assets and
sales individually or jointly meet merger control thresholds, and have a
20% or more market participation, require authorization. The 2009 law
has made it totally clear that SIC will review both horizontal and vertical
transactions. Currently, there is a discussion as to whether merger control
applies to conglomerate mergers in which there is no market overlap. It
29. Decreto 663 de 1993 [Decree 663 of 1993], 2 de Abril de 1993, Diario Oficial
[DO.] No. 40.820, 5 de Abril de 1993 (Colom.).
30. CODIGO DE COMERCIO [COD. COM.] [Commercial Code] art. 1866; Decree 410,
1971, Diario Oficial [DO.] No. 33.339, 16 de Julio de 1971 (Colum.).
31. Ley 182 de 1995 [Law 182 of 1995], Diario Oficial [D.O.] No. 41.681, 20 de
Enero de 1995 (Colum.).
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seems that is not the case, however, since the 2009 law did not refer to
those cases.
SIC's position is that a merger transaction amounts to an
entrepreneurial concentration requiring authorization from the competi-
tion authority when the companies involved cease to participate indepen-
dently in the market and are, therefore, permanently controlled by the same
management or decision center, whatever the legal structure. SIC has not
issued any particular doctrine on when joint ventures are caught. Given
SIC's interpretation, however, it seems that only joint ventures that create a
sort of permanent undertaking should be subject to merger control.
Colombian law offers two definitions of control. One is found in the
Commerce Code and applies to corporations; the other is in the competi-
tion law and refers to undertakings in a broader way. According to the
broader definition, control is the possibility of influencing, directly or indi-
rectly, the business policy of a company or undertaking; the initiation,
variation, or termination of the activities of the company; or the use of
assets essential to the company's operations.
The definition of corporate control includes both internal and external
control. Pursuant to article 261 of the Commerce Code, internal control
exists when a company, directly or through other subsidiaries, owns more
than fifty percent of the capital stock of another company or owns or com-
mands enough voting stock to appoint the majority of its directors.3 2
External control, on the other hand, exists when, by way of a contract or
other relationship different from the ownership of stock, one person or
company can exercise a dominant influence over a corporation.
As mentioned before, transactions that do not imply the acquisition of
control are not caught by the merger antitrust legislation.
B. Authorization of the SIC
According to article 9 of Law 1340, 2009, merger transactions that
require previous authorization from SIC in Colombia have the following
characteristics: (i) the companies party to the transaction engage in the
same activities or participate in the same vertical value chain; (ii) in the
year prior to the transaction, the companies, individually or in concert,
made sales or own assets in Colombia in an amount sufficient to meet SIC
thresholds; and (iii) the companies have an individual or joint participa-
tion of at least twenty percent in the relevant market. Right now, Resolu-
tion 22195, 2006 defines the notification threshold as an amount
equivalent to $20 million, expressed in terms of monthly minimum wages.
In an effort to focus on relatively significant operations, one can expect
that SIC will increase the threshold.
SIC considers mergers that do not meet the above-mentioned thresh-
olds generally authorized, which only need to leave a note in the minutes of
32. COD. COM. art. 261; Decree 410 de 1971 [Decree No. 410 of 1971], Diario
Oficial [DO.] No. 33.339, 16 de Junio de 1971 (Colum.).
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their board of directors stating that the transaction falls within the General
Authorization System.
As mentioned before, it is mandatory for merging parties to request
authorization (when the thresholds are met) and obtain clearance from the
authority before the merger operation produces its effects in the Colom-
bian market. This means that it is possible to negotiate and sign the con-
tracts and documents that carry out the transaction, if such documents
and contracts provide for authorization as a condition precedent to their
effectiveness. There is no compulsory waiting period. Clearance is not
required when companies that belong to the same corporate group carry
out the transaction.
C. Foreign Mergers
Colombia adheres to the effects theory, meaning foreign transactions
that produce effects in the Colombian market are subject to SIC review.
The same legislation governs both domestic and foreign mergers. SIC doc-
trine requires authorization of foreign mergers where both parties to the
merger market their products, directly or indirectly, in Colombia. Under
the former doctrine of SIC, clearance was not necessary for foreign mergers
when the products of one or both of the merging parties were sold in
Colombia by independent companies that assumed the risk and made the
decisions associated with the import and sale of the products. Neverthe-
less, one can consider this doctrine overruled after the SABMiller-Bavaria
merger. In this case, SIC requested an antitrust filing, even though inde-
pendent importers sold the products and brands of SABMiller.
D. Procedure Before SIC
Law 1340, 2009 substantially changed the procedure for merger
control.
1. Notification and Clearance Timetable
As mentioned before, Colombian merger control requires previous
notification of merger operations. This means that SIC must clear the
operation before it enters into effect in Colombia. Parties may execute
agreements but must declare that performance is dependent on SIC clear-
ance. Both parties are responsible for making the notification and present-
ing all relevant information to SIC.
a. Mergers Carried Without Previous Clearance
Mergers executed without previous clearance from SIC are infractions
of antitrust laws. The companies and their administrators are subject to
fines. SIC may impose maximum fines equivalent to $20 million for the
companies and $450,000 for the administrators. In addition, SIC can issue
an order to reverse the operation if it finds that the transaction produces an
undue restriction on competition. Further, one should be aware that a
judge can void an operation carried out in violation of competition laws,
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resulting in significant economic consequences. It is important to under-
stand that SIC is not a judicial authority. SIC must obtain such a declara-
tion through ordinary processes before courts of general jurisdiction.
It is, therefore, important that the foreign merger has no effect in
Colombian territory until it has been approved by SIC. There is not yet a
clear doctrine regarding the closing of foreign transactions before
obtaining clearance with SIC, with a carve out provision for Colombia.
However, it is advisable to include such a clause, as well as any other ele-
ments that help to assure SIC that the transaction will not have effects in
Colombia before it has been cleared.
b. Process and Timing
The petitioners file a pre-evaluation petition with a succinct descrip-
tion of the transaction.
Within the following three days, SIC must determine whether it
needs to review the transaction. SIC will end the proceedings if it
decides the transaction does not require review.
Within the three-day period, if SIC finds that review is necessary, it
will provide notice through a publication in a newspaper of suffi-
cient circulation to enable interested parties to file any information
pertinent to the analysis of the transaction.
The petitioners can request that SIC refrain from publication to pre-
serve public order, in which case SIC can accept the petition while
maintaining the confidentiality of the transaction and procedures.
SIC has thirty working days (forty-five calendar days in most
cases)33 during which it studies the transaction to determine
whether the transaction poses a risk to competition, prompting a
continuation of the review proceedings, or not, in which case SIC
will approve it.
If the procedure continues, SIC must inform the regulatory and the
control agencies in the sectors relevant to the transaction. The agen-
cies have the opportunity to present their technical advice regarding
the transaction to SIC within ten working days of the notification.
Also, the agencies are free to participate in the proceedings at any
point. While the agencies' views are not binding on SIC, it must
justify a decision to depart from the opinions.
The authorities and other interested parties must file any informa-
tion they deem relevant to the analysis with SIC within fifteen days
of the decision to continue the proceedings. They are free to pro-
pose conditions and other measures that might reduce the anti-com-
petitive effects associated with the transaction.
SIC can request that the authorities and interested parties explain
or supplement any information they have filed regarding the
proceedings.
33. According to article 62 of Law 4, 1913, when laws and official acts refer to terms
of days, they are understood as working days, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
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* Within this fifteen-day period, the petitioners can access the infor-
mation filed by the authorities and third parties and attempt to
rebut it.
* Within three months following the final filing date, SIC must make
one of three possible decisions-simple authorization, conditioned
authorization (i.e., clearance predicated on the application of suita-
ble remedies), or objection.
* Under Colombian law, if SIC exceeds the deadline, the transaction
is automatically approved and SIC surrenders its authority over the
case. This is known as positive administrative silence. However,
one should note that this scenario is unlikely given that there have
been only a couple of such instances in twenty years.
* If the parties to the merger remain inactive for two months at any
point during the proceedings, SIC will consider the petition for
authorization of the transaction abandoned.
2. Presentation of the Petition
There is no standard format to request SIC authorization. However,
Decree 1302, 1964 defines the specific information that the merging par-
ties must provide in the petition. SIC has expanded and developed this list
of information through its general regulation found in Circular Letter No.
10. The list is very detailed. It includes information concerning the terms
of the transaction, the merging companies, competitors, consumers, market
conditions, barriers to entering the market, and any other information that
may allow SIC to assess the effects of the transaction properly. One should
note that SIC is free to delay its review until the information-gathering pro-
cess is complete.
E. Review Test
Article II of Law 1340, 2009 provides that SIC must prohibit or object
to mergers that will generate an undue restriction on competition. Of
course, all mergers tend to restrict competition. As such, SIC's objective is
to determine those mergers that will produce an undue restriction on
competition.
Under article 5 of Decree 1302, 1964, mergers exhibiting the follow-
ing characteristics are presumed to produce an undue restriction on
competition:
* Where the merging parties engaged in anti-competitive activity
prior to the transaction, and
* Where the merged entity would acquire the capacity to impose
unfair prices on consumers through the transaction.
One should consider that, according to article 12 of Law 1340, 2009
and Law 2153, 1992, SIC cannot object to mergers in which the parties can
demonstrate, using recognized methods, the following: (i) that the positive
effects of the transaction will exceed its negative impact on consumers, and
(ii) that there is no viable alternative to generate the positive effects of the
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transaction. This is known as the efficiency exemption; it is designed to
justify authorization of mergers that increase market concentration, but
also generate efficiencies that can be passed on to consumers. The effi-
ciency exception was already in effect in article 51 of Decree 2153, 1992.
However, SIC is yet to recognize this exemption in a merger review.
In at least two cases, SIC has accepted the so-called "failing-industry
defense." Using this mechanism, SIC authorized the mergers in order to
save companies that were facing imminent bankruptcy.
The law does not explain the procedures or rationale utilized by SIC
during its evaluation, and the authority has not published any documents
that would provide any guidance. One can, however, identify some of the
general elements in SIC's analytic process:
1. SIC determines the general market in light of the relevant product
and geographic markets. SIC defines the product market narrowly
using the hypothetic monopolist test (SSNIP test) in order to isolate
products, whether goods or services, that can behave as substitutes
for the product affected by the merger.
2. SIC assesses the competitive pressure caused by product substi-
tutes and potential competition from other companies.
3. SIC calculates the participation levels of the merging companies in
the relevant market and then applies concentration indexes like
HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) and CR4 (four-firm concentra-
tion ratio) in order to establish the merger's potential effect on the
market.
4. In order to determine market contestability and the capacity of the
market to absorb other competitors, SIC evaluates potential barri-
ers to entering the market, such as import tariffs and duties, ship-
ping costs, market saturation, the cost of building a local plant, etc.
5. SIC reviews potential conditions and discusses them with the par-
ties. In some circumstances, SIC substantially modifies the parties'
proposed conditions. In general, the authority prefers structural
over behavioral remedies. SIC often requires the merged entity to
divest part of its business.
6. At this point, the particular circumstances that will trigger an
objection or a conditioned approval are not clear. One can assume
that SIC would reach such conclusions where a balance of the pre-
ceding elements weighs against the merger.
7. For instance, SIC would probably reject a merger that significantly
increases market concentration, faces no perfect or even imperfect
produce substitutes, does not have to cope with competition, enjoys
high barriers to market entrance and limited contestability, and no
possible structural remedies.
8. One should note, however, that SIC has prohibited less than one
percent of informed mergers in its history.
As said before, SIC has been applying reasoning and analysis similar
to those developed in the European Union and the United States for some
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years now. There is much debate as to the use of economic tools, such as
the concentration indexes that were prepared for developed economies,
without adjustment to the size and specific characteristics of the Colom-
bian economy. Most markets in a developing economy are small and
already concentrated, but that does not mean that there is no competition
or that it will become impossible for new competitors to enter the market.
From the lines of merger cases that SIC conditioned or objected to, it is
possible to deduce that SIC has moved from the "market dominance" test it
used initially to a more comprehensive "substantially lessening of competi-
tion" test. It is now clear that, under the 2009 law, SIC has the capacity to
review vertical mergers. There is much debate regarding its potential
authority to review conglomerate mergers.
Non-competition issues are not relevant in the merger review process
and will not be considered or discussed by SIC.
As recent cases demonstrate, SIC has made significant strides in its
ability to study and regulate mergers in the past few years. Despite this
progress, substantial uncertainty remains as to what kind of analysis SIC
will apply as it reviews mergers.
In compliance with the new 2009 law, SIC will have to issue its guide-
lines for assessing mergers, which will help to explain and illustrate its
decision-making process for the benefit of the parties to the merger.
F. Remedies and Ancillary Restraints
Early in the review process, it is important for the merging companies
to identify if the transaction should be subject to remedies, at least in a
general way, so that the authority is aware of the intention or willingness of
the parties to discuss them. In those cases, when SIC finds that the pro-
posed transaction may pose undue restrictions to competition but believes
there are options to correct such distortion, it will authorize the merger
provided the parties undertake certain remedies.
Such conditions have ranged from elimination of exclusivity for dis-
tributors to the obligation of producing for a competitor at variable cost,
allowing a competitor to use a percentage of installed capacity, and even
the obligation to divest part of the business. SIC has shown a preference
for structural remedies, such as divestments, over conduct or behavioral
remedies.
SIC customarily requires that the parties comply with structural reme-
dies within a certain time limit (generally, less than one year). Compliance
with behavioral remedies is also required for a limited period of time (gen-
erally, no more than three years). Pursuant to article 11 of Law 1340,
2009, SIC must periodically review whether the parties have complied with
the conditions and obligations imposed. Traditionally, SIC requires that
an external auditor verifies the full compliance of the remedies and
presents reports to the authority from time to time. Finally, SIC requests
that the merging parties put in place a bank or insurance bond to guaran-
tee full compliance with the remedies.
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SIC has not made distinctions regarding the imposition of remedies in
foreign -to -foreign mergers.
Even though SIC has not rendered an opinion on this issue, one could
assume that the merger control authority would permit reasonable ancil-
lary restrictions.
G. Involvement of Other Parties or Authorities
SIC has not admitted third parties to fully participate in the merger
review process. The authority will not grant them access to information
submitted by the merging parties, notify third parties of its determinations,
or permit them to file a reconsideration plea. Though third parties are free
to present documents or express their opinions to SIC, the authority is not
required to consider them. At its discretion, SIC may seek third-party testi-
mony or information that might assist the authority in the review process.
Pursuant to paragraph 3 of article 4 of Law 155, 1959, all the informa-
tion the parties include in the antitrust filing is strictly confidential. Any
public official who discloses any information regarding the procedure
faces removal from office and criminal prosecution.
The Colombian economy is open to foreign investment. However,
there are exchange, tax, labor, securities, and special-sector requirements
that one must check about with local council before entering into a
transaction.
H. Judicial Review
Decisions issued by SIC are not subject to appeal. Rather, a disgrun-
tled party can seek a reconsideration plea before the same public official.
The party must file the reconsideration plea within five working days after
notification of the decision. The superintendent has to make a decision
within the following two months, though the superintendent can extend
this period if there is a need to gather additional evidence.
A party may challenge the final decision issued by SIC by means of a
judicial action before the Administrative Jurisdiction. The party must file
this action within the four months following the decision to object or pro-
hibit the merger. However, this alternative is not very attractive to the par-
ties because of the length of the procedure (six to ten years).
I. Penalties
SIC will impose penalties where the merging parties fail to disclose
that a transaction meets the criteria as well as in cases of "jumping the
gun." The maximum fine that SIC may enforce amounts to $20 million for
the companies and $450,000 for the administrators.
Conclusions
As described in this document, the new Law 1340, 2009, introduced
important changes to Merger Control Law.
380 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 43
* A new market participation threshold that divides the transactions
that need previous authorization from SIC (authorization proce-
dure) from those that only need to be reported to SIC without a
waiting period (notification procedure).
* A new procedure in two stages that will allow SIC to authorize
quickly those transactions that do not pose a threat to competition.
* The possibility for the participation of interested third parties.
* The possibility for the analysis of structural and behavioral
conditions.
* The new definition of the efficiency exemption.
The modifications described will undoubtedly produce a very impor-
tant effect in Colombian Merger Law.
There are many challenges ahead in the interpretation of the new law.
That is why it is important that the Authority takes the opportunity to
issue the merger control guidelines as requested by the law-to help the
companies that have the obligation to report their merger operations to the
State.
